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WHY ARE  STABILIZATIONS DELAYED? 
ABSTRACTS 
When a stabilization  has significant  distributional  implications  (as in 
the  case of  tax  increases to  eliminate a large  budget deficit)  different 
socio-economic  groups  will attempt to shift  the burden of stabilization  onto 
other groups.  The  process leading  to a  stabilization becomes a  war of 
attrition',  with  each  group  finding  it  rational to  attempt to wait  the 
others out.  Stabilization  occurs only  when one group concedes and is forced 
to bear a disproportionate  share  of the burden  of fiscal  adjustment. 
We  solve  for  the  expected  time  of  stabilization  in  a  model  of 
'rational"  delay  based on a war of attrition  and present comparative  statics 
results  relating  the expected time of stabilization  to several political  and 
economic variables.  We  also motivate this approach and  its  results  by 
comparison  to historical  episodes. 
Alberto  Ales  ma  Allan  Drazen 
Department  of Economics  Department  of Economics 
Harvard  University  Princeton  University 
Cambridge,  MA 02138  Princeton,  NJ 08540 I. Introduction 
Countries often follow policies for extended periods of time which are recognized to be 
infeasible in the long run.  For instance, large deficits implying an explosive path of 
government debt and accelerating inflation are allowed to continue even though it is apparent 
that such deficits will have to be eliminated sooner or later.  A puzzling question is why these 
countries do not stabilize immediately, once it becomes apparent that current policies are 
unsustainable and a that change in policy  will have to be adopted eventually.  Delays in 
stabilization are particularly inefficient if the longer a country waits the more costly is the 
policy adjustment  needed to stabilize, and if the period of instability  before the policy change is 
characterized by economic  inefficiencies,  such as high and variable inflation. 
The literature on the pre—stabilization  dynamics implied by an anticipated  future 
stabilization (for example, Sargent and Wallace [1981], Drazen and Helpman [1987,19891) 
assumes that the timing of the future policy change is exogenous.  Since in these models the 
long—run infeasibility of current policy  is known from the beginning, what is missing is an 
explanation of why the infeasible policy is not abandoned immediately.  Explanations  of the 
timing of stabilization based on irrationality,  such as waiting to stabilize until "things get 
really bad", are unconvincing: since the deterioration in the fiscal position can be forseen, the 
argument turns on certain countries being more irrational than others.  Explanations which 
give a key role to exogenous shocks leave unxeplained both why countries do not stabilize as 
soon as unfavorable shocks  occur and why stabilizations that are undertaken often don't seem 
to coincide with significant observable changes in external circumstances. 
'In Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Drazen and Helpman (1987) the timing of  stabilization is 
deterministic and exogenous; in Drazen and Helpman (1989) the timing is stochastic, but the 
distribution of the time of stabilization is exogenous. —2— 
This paper argues that the timing of  stabilizations and, in particular,  their 
postponement  cannot be understood in models in which the policymaker is viewed as a social 
planner maximizing the welfare of a representative individual,  On the contrary, heterogeneity 
in the population is crucial in explaining delays in stabilization  Our basic idea is that under 
certain circumstances the process leading to a stabilization can be described as a "war of 
attrition" between different socio—economic groups with conflicting distributional  objectives. 
This means, first, that delays in stabilization arise due to a political stalemate over 
distribution, and, second, that stabilization occurs when a political consolidation leads to a 
resolution of the distributional conflict. 
More specifically, when it is agreed that stabilization requires a change in fiscal policy  to 
eliminate  budget deficits and growing government debt, there may be disagreement about how 
the burden of the policy change is to be shared.  When socio—economic groups perceive the 
possibility of shifting this burden elsewhere, each group may attempt to wait the others out. 
This war of attrition ends and a stabilization is enacted when certain groups "concede" and 
allow their political opponents to decide on the allocation of the burden of fiscal adjustment. 
Concession may occur via legislative agreement, electoral outcomes, or (as is often observed) 
ceding power  of decree to policymakers. 
We present a simple model of delayed stabilization due to a war of attrition and derive 
the expected time of stabilization as a function of characteristics of the economy, including 
parameters  meant to capture, in a very rough way, the degree of political polarization.  For 
example, the  more uneven is the expected allocation of the costs of stabilization  when it occurs, 
the later is the expected date of a stabilization.  Hence, if unequal distribution of the burden of 
taxation is an indicator of  political polarization, more politically polarized countries will —3— 
experience longer periods of instability.2  More institutional  adaptation  to the distortions 
associated with instability also implies later expected stabilization, while partial attempts to 
control the deficit prior to a full stabilization may make the expected time of full stabilization 
either earlier or later.  We further show that if it is the poor who suffer most from the 
distortions associated with high government deficits and debt, they may bear the largest share 
of the costs of stabilization.  We also discuss the relation of the distribution  of income to the 
timing of stabilization  and show conditions for a more unequal distribution  to imply either an 
earlier or a later expected date of stabilization. 
Our approach is related to the literature  on dynamic games between a monetary and a 
fiscal authority with conflicting objectives (Sargent [1986], Tabellini [1986,1987], Loewy [1988]). 
In that literature a "war of attrition" is played between the two branches of government: an 
unsustainable combination of  monetary and fiscal policies is in place until one side concedes. 
Our shift in emphasis to a game between interest  groups has several justifications.  First, the 
assumption that the monetary authority is independent of the fiscal authority  is unrealistic for 
most countries with serious problems of economic instability. Second, the difference in the 
objective functions of different branches of  government may be related to their representing 
different constituencies; here we tackle issues of heterogeneity directly.4  Finally, by explicitly 
modelling distributional conflicts, we can derive results relating  the timing of stabilization to 
2The effects of political instability  on the path of  government debt is studied in a different 
framework by Alesina and Tabellini (1987,1989),  Tabellini and Alesina (1989), and Persson and 
Svensson  (1989). 
31n contrast,  a model with heterogeneity, but with a social planner or benevolent government 
would predict that the burden of costs of stabilization would be more equitably distributed. 
4Rogoff (1985) has suggested that it may be optimal to appoint a Central Banker with 
preferences wiuch do not coincide with social preferences.  In this case, however, the Central 
Bank's preferences would  be known  by the public, while a war of attrition requires uncertainty 
about an opponent's  characteristics. —4— 
economic and political characteristics of different economies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some regularities observed in a 
number of stabilizations which suggest using a war of attrition as a model.  Section 3 presents a 
specific stylized model of the process leading to a stabilization based on the empirical 
observations and shows  how delays result from individually rational behavior.  Section 4 
presents comparative static results on how the expected date of  stabilization is affected by 
changes in the economy's characteristics.  The final section presents conclusions and suggests 
extensions. 
II. Delayed Stabilization as a War of Attrition 
No single model can explain every episode of delay in enacting a macroeconomic 
stabilization.  Historical evidence suggests, however, that in a large number of  hyperinfiations, 
it was disagreement over allocating the burden of fiscal change which delayed the adoption of a 
new policy.  We begin by noting common features of the stabilization process across several 
episodes, features which suggest modelling stabilization as a war of attrition. 
1. There is agreement over the need for a fiscal change, but a political stalemate over 
how the burden of  higher taxes or expenditure cuts should be allocated.  In the political  debate 
over stabilization, this distributional question is central. 
Sharp disagreements over over allocating the burden of paying for the war were common 
in the belligerent countries after World War I (Alesina [1988], Eichengreen [1989]).  For 
example, in France, Germany, and Italy, the political battle over monetary and fiscal policy 
was not over the need for reducing large budget deficits, but over which groups should bear the 
higher taxes to achieve that end.  Parties of the right favored proportional income and indirect 
taxes; parties of the left favored capital levies and more progressive income taxes (Haig [1929). —5— 
Maier [1975]).  Though Britain after the war also faced a problems of fiscal stabilization, the 
dominant position of the Conservatives led to a rapid stabilization by means which favored the 
Conservatives' traditional  constituencies.  Once the need  for sharply restrictive  aggregate 
demand policies to end the Israeli inflation was widely accepted,5 there was still a stalemate 
over distribution: specifically, there was an unwillingness  by labor to accept sharp drops in 
employment and real wages. 
2. When stabilization occurs it coincides with a political consolidation.  Often, one side 
becomes  politically dominant.  The burden of  stabilization is sometimes quite unequal, with the 
politically weaker groups bearing a larger burden.  Often this means the lower classes, with 
successful  stabilizations being regressive. 
The successful stabilizations in France (1926) and Italy (1922—24) coincided with a clear 
consolidation of power by the right.  In both cases,  the burden fell disproportionately on the 
working class (Haig [1929], Maier [1975]). 
The German stabilization  of November 1923 followed  a new Enabling  Act giving the 
new Stresemann government power to cut through legislative deadlocks and quickly adopt 
fiscal measures by decree.  Though the government which took power in August was a "Grand 
Coalition" of the right and the left, by autumn "the far right was more dangerous and powerful 
than the socialist left" and government policy  reflected the perceived need to appease 
conservative interest groups (Maier [1975], pp. 384—6). 
The Israeli stabilization  also occurred with a National Unity government in power more 
importantly,  what distinguished the Jul program from earlier failed attempts was the heavier 
In the early 1980's there was substantial  disagreement over whether high inflation was  due to 
fiscal problems, or to "bubbles" or other factors suggesting a direct attack on expectations. —6— 
burden it would place on labor.  On the other side, the failure of Argentina to stabilize in the 
face  of endemic inflation has gone hand in hand with continued political polarization and 
instability and the failure of any group to consolidate its power effectively (Dornbusch and 
DePablo[1988]). 
3. Successful  stabilizations are usually preceded by several failed attempts; often a 
orevious program appears Quite similar to the successful  one. 
In a war of attrition the cost of waiting means that the passage of time will imply 
concession on the same terms that a player earlier found "unacceptable".  The components of 
the successful Poincare stabilization  of 1926 are quite similar to his program of 1924.  Several 
unsuccessful attempts in Germany appear quite similar ex ante to the November 1923 program 
(Dornbusch [1988]).  Many aspects of the July 1985 stabilization in Israel bad been previously 
proposed, but rejected by the government. 
To summarize, the central role of conflict over how the burden of stabilization is to lie 
shared; the importance of  political consolidation in the adoption of a program; and the fact that 
programs which were previously rejected ate agreed to after the passage of time suggests 
modelling delayed stabilization  as arising from a war of attrition between different 
socio—economic groups. 
In the basic war of attrition model from biology,  two animals are fighting over a prize. 
Fighting is costly, and the fight ends when one animal drops out, with the other gaining the 
prize.  Suppose that the two contestants are not identical, either in the costs of  remaining n 
the fight or in the utility they assign to the prize.  Suppose further that each contestant's  value 
of  these is known only to himself, his opponent knowing only the distribution  of these values. —7— 
The individual's problem is to choose a stopping time based on his type, that is, the 
value of his costs and payoffs, on the distribution of his opponent's possible type, and on the 
knowledge  that his opponent is solving the same choice  problem.  That is, he chooses a time to 
concede if his opponent has not already conceded.  In equilibrium the time of concession is 
determined by the condition that at the optimal time, the cost of remaining in the fight 
another instant of time is Just equal to the expected gain from remaining, namely the 
probability that the rival drops out at that instant multiplied by the gain if the rival concedes. 
At the beginning of the contest the gain to remaining exceeds the gain to dropping out, as there 
is some probability that one's opponent is of a type that drops out early.  The passage of time 
with no concession on his part conveys the information that this is not the case, until one's own 
concession  occurs  according to the above  criterion. 
For a war of attrition between heterogeneous individuals to give expected finite delay in 
concession  under incomplete information, two obvious features are important. First, there 
must be a cost to remaining in the fight, that is to not conceding. Second,  the payoff to the 
winner must exceed that to the loser.  In the next section we show how stabilizations may be 
modelled with these features in mind. 
II. The Model 
We consider an economy as in Drazen and Helpman (1987,1989)  in which the 
government is running a positive deficit (inclusive of debt service) implying growing 
government debt.  Stabilization Consists  of an increase in taxes which brings the deficit to zero, 
so that government debt is constant.  We assume that prior to an agreement on how to 
6Since we are considering an economy  with constant output. this is equivalent to a rising 
debt—to—GNP ratio. —8— 
share the burden of higher taxes, the government is limited to highly inefficient and 
distortionary methods of public finance.7 In particular,  monetization of  deficits, with the 
associated costs of high and variable inflation, is often a main source of government revenue 
prior to a fiscal stabilization.  The level of distortionary financing, and hence the welfare loss 
associated with it, rises with the level of government debt.  These welfare losses may differ 
across socio—econornic groups: for example the poor may have far less access to assets which 
protect them against inflation.€ 
A second type of cost to continuing in a war of attrition is more directly political.  For a 
group to prevent the burden of a stabilization being placed on it,  it must mobilize and use 
resources for lobbying activities to influence the outcome of the legislative or electoral jrocess. 
Different groups may differ in their political influence and therefore in the level of effort needed 
to continue fighting the war of attrition. We develop the model stressing the first 
interpretation  of pre—stabilization  costs, but will return to political interpretations  in the 
concluding section. 
The benefit of  stabilization derives from the move away from highly distortionary 
methods of  financing government expenditures.  In this respect, stabilization benefits 
everybody.  The differential benefits reflect the fact that the increase in nondistortionary  taxes 
is unequally distributed. 
Concession in our model is the agreement by one side to bear a disproportionate share of 
TCukierman,  Edwards , and  Tabellini (1989), for example, argue that unstable LDC's often 
exhibit highly inefficient fiscal systems in which it is extremely difficult to raise standard 
income taxes, leading to reliance on inflation and very wasteful forms of taxation. 
Tbe view that the utility loss from living in an unstabilized economy flows from the use of 
distortionary financing of part of the government deficit raises an obvious question: why not 
simply accumulate debt until an agreemwnt can be reached on levying less distortionary taxes? 
We suggest there may be constraints  on the rate of growth of the debt, especially if it is 
external, but do not model this here. —9— 
the tax increase necessary to effect a stabilization.  Interpreted  literally, the notion of 
concession which ends the war of attrition is not observed.  However, as the examples in the 
previnus section illustrate,  effective concession may be reflected in a formal agreement between 
the various sides, as in the Israeli case; in the the formation of a new government which is given 
extraordinary  powers, as in the French or German cases; or in the outcome of  elections in which 
one side gains a clear majority, and opposing groups decide not to block their program any 
longer.9 
More formally, consider a small open economy which issues external debt to cover any 
deficits not covered by printing  money.  The economy is composed of a number of 
heterogeneous interest groups which differ from one another in the welfare loss they suffer from 
the distortions associated with the pre—stabilization  methods of  government finance.  We will 
first specify  government behavior, then the maximizing behavior of interest  groups.  This 
characterizes the war of attrition leading to a stabilization.  From this process we can derive an 
endogenous distribution  of time of  stabilization. 
Until  t = 0  the government budget is balanced, with external government debt 
constant at level  b0 ￿  0.  At  t = 0  a shock hits reducing available tax revenues.  From  t = 0 
until the date of stabilization a fraction of the deficit  1 — 
y  is covered by issuing debt and a 
fraction  by distortionary taxation.  (Though the economy is non—monetary,  a major type of 
distortionary taxation is inflation arising from printing money.)  What is important  for us is 
not that  ' is fixed, but that it is  positive.  Calling  g0  the level of expenditures after  t = 0, 
debt  b(t)  evolves according to 
9Elections may give one side a clear mandate not because its opponents have conceded on their 
distributional objectives, but because a majority of voters see that side as more competent to 
handle an economic crisis. — 10 — 
(1)  b(t) = (1—')(rb(t) + g0) 
where  r  is the world interest rate, assumed to be constant.  This may be solved to yield 
(2)  b(t) = 
b0e(1_7)rt  + e(1_7)Tt 
— 1). 
Defining  b0 +  , taxes before a stabilization are 
(3)  T(t) = (rb(t) + g0) =  eTt. 
A stabilization consists of an increase in taxes sufficient to prevent further growth in the 
debt. Hence taxes to be levied at the date of stabilization  T  are 
r(T) = rb(T) + 
where  is the level of  expenditures after a stabilization.  If we assume for simplicity that 
= 
g0, we have from (2) 
(4)  r(T) = re(1_T. 
An agreement to stabilize is an agreement on how the taxes  T(T) are to be apportioned 
between different interest groups.  For simplicity assume there are only two groups (an 
assumption easily generalized).  The "stabilizer" assumes a fraction  a >  1/2 of  the tax  burden —11 — 
at  T, the "non—stabilizer"  a fraction  1  — a.  The fraction  a itself  is not bargained on: it is a 
given parameter  meant to capture the degree of polarization in the society.  A value of a  close 
to one represents a high degree of  polarization or a lack of  political cohesiveness. 
Taxes after a stabilization are assumed to be non—distortionary. What is important is 
that they are 1  d.istortionary than taxes before a stabilization.  In fact, if taxes after a 
stabilization  were equally distortionary,  there would in general be no incentive to concede, that 
is, to stabilize. 
Infinitely—lived  groups  may differ from one another in two respects.  One is their flow 
endowment of income y.  The second is the utility loss they suffer due to distortionary taxes. 
Let us index group i's loss by  0, where  0 is drawn from a distribution  F(), with lower and 
upper bounds  9  and . What is critical is that  0 
is known only to the group itself, other 
groups knowing only the distribution  F(0).  The results on delayed stabilization are consistent 
with a functional relation  between y and  0, as long  as  0 
cannot be  inferred.  (For example 
with uncertainty  about the marginal utility of income.)  For simplicity we assume that  the 
utility loss from distortionary taxes,  K,  is linear in the level of taxes, namely'° 
K(t) = Ojr(t) 
The  flow utility of group  i  is linear in consumption and is of the form 
u(t) =  —  — 
'°\Ve could adopt a more general specification for  K, such as 
K(t) = O(,())l+m  with  m> 0. 
The qualitative  features of  our results do not change with this more general specification.  The 
differences  will be emphasized below. —  12 
— 
where  c  is consumption.  (Subtracting  y is simply  a normalization.)  After a stabilization 
= 0, as taxes after a stabilization are assumed to be non—distortionary. We suppress the  I 
subscript  on the function  u.  If  is independent of y, distribution of  income does not affect 
the timing of  stabilization.  We consider the alternative  case in section IV. 
The objective of each group is to madmize  expected present discounted utility by choice 
of a time path of consumption and a date to concede and agree to bear the share a of taxes if 
the other group has not already conceded.  Let us denote flow utility before a stabilization by 
uD(t) and the lifetime utility of the stabilizer and the non—stabilizer  from the date of 
stabilization onward by  vS(T)  and  VN(T)  respectively.  Lifetime utility of the stabilizer and 
the non—stabilizer  if stabilization occurs at time  T  may then be written as 
T 
U1(T) = 
J  u(x)ed.x + e_rTVJ(T)  j = S,N. 
0 
Expected utility as of time zero as a function of  one's chosen concession time  T1  is the sum of 
UN(T)  multiplied by the probability of one's opponent conceding at  T  for all  T < T1 and 
US(Ti)  multiplied by the probability of one's opponent not having conceded by  T.  If we 
denote by  11(T) the distribution  of an opponent's optimal time of concession  (this is of course 
endogenous and will be derived below) and by  h(T) the associated density function, expected 
utility as a function of T  is 
1T.  N 
EU(T.) = (1- H(T.))U5(T) +  U (x)h(x)dx 
1  1  1 — 13 — 
= (1 
— H(T)) [JTiuD(X)e_rxdx + e_rTi 
vS(T)J 
+ J:= uD(z)e_dz  + 
e_TXVN(x)]h(x)dx 
The time path of consumption and  T1  are chosen to maximize (8). 
With linear utility any consumption path satisfying the intertemporal  budget constraint 
with equality gives equal utility.  Denote by  D,  cS,  and  cN  consumption before a 
stabilization, after a stabilization for the "stabilizer", and after a stabilization for the 
'non—stabilizer" respectively.  Assuming that each of the two groups pays one—half of taxes 
before a stabilization,  we have the lifetime budget constraints 
rT 
(9)  j  cU(x)e)Cdx + J  c(x)e  dx  = 
J(y 
—  (x))edx  + JT( 
— e(1_T)e_tx 
(10)  JTcD(x)e_rxdx  + JzcN(x)e_lx = 
—  x))edx + J( 
— (l_)r1_7T)edx. 
The following consumption path is then clearly feasible 
(ha)  cD(t) = y 
— re(1_t  0 < t < T 
(hib)  cS(t) = y — ai&e(1T  t ￿  T — 14 — 
(lic)  cN(t) =  — (l_a)re(1_'T  t ￿  T 11 
Flow utility before a stabilization is then 
(12)  u?(t) =  — re(1_7)rt 
— 
= —'r( + Oi)&e(1_7t 
which is the income effect of taxes plus the welfare loss arising from taxes being distortionary. 
(Note that we assume that the distortionary cost to each group depends on the total level of 
distortionary taxes.) 
With constant consumption after a stabilization, discounted utility  (j = N,S)  is 
simply constant  flow utility for each group  divided by  r.  Using (11) and (6) (with K = 0) 
one  immediately  obtains 
(13)  v'(T) 
— VS(T) = (2n 
— 
which is the present discounted value of the excess taxes that the stabilizer must pay relative 
to the non—stabilizer. 
We are now ready to determine  T, the optimal concession  time for a group with cost 
0.22  Since we do not know the distribution  H(T), we cannot use (8) directly.  However, by 
showing that  is monotunic in  O, we can derive the relation  between  H(T) and the known 
"Formally,  a solution does not require consumption to be non—negative  at each point; it is only 
required that at each point at which an  individual does not concede, the utility from remaining 
is higher than the utility from dropping out.  With a standard concave utility function the 
solution would  have the property  of no concession  requiring non—negative  consumption. 
l2This derivation of the symmetric equilibrium follows Bliss and Nalebuff (1984). — 15 — 
F(0), namely  (1—H[T(0)])  = F(0). We therefore  first establish 
LEMMA  1: The optimal concession time for group i is monotonicaliy decreasing in  O, that is 
T(81) < a'. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
We now want to find a symmetric equilibrium where each group's concession behavior is 
described by a monotonically increasing function  T(0).  The idea here is to show that there 
exists a Nash equilibrium where if all other groups  are behaving according to  T(O) group  i 
finds it optimal to concede according to  T(0), and to characterize  T(0).'3  Having done that, 
the expected time of stabilization  is the expected minimum  T, with the expectation taken over 
F(0). 
PROPOSITION  1:  There exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium with each group's optimal 
behavior described by a concession function  T(0), where T(0) is implicitly defined by 
T'(0)=—44 (2 —1)/r 
ru)  +  - 
and the boundary condition 
'3There may also be assymetric equilibria (that is, where groups behave according to different 
T(O)) even  though each group's  0 is known to be drawn from the same distribution  F(0).  We 
do not investigate them and restrict our attention to the symmetric equilibrium.  Of course, if 
different groups' endowments are perceived to be drawn from different distributions,  each group 
will have a different T(0).  See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole  (1987). — 16 — 
(15)  T()=O. 
Proof: See Appendix 
To understand the nature of the optimal strategy,  we may write (14) as 
(16)  [f3i]2a_ (o+.a) 
The right hand side is the cost of waiting another instant to concede.  The left—hand side is the 
expected gain to waiting another instant to concede, which is the product of the conditional 
probability that one's opponent concedes  (the  hazard rate, in brackets) multiplied by the gain 
if the other group concedes.  Concession occurs when the (group—specific)  cost of waiting just 
equals the expected benfit from waiting.  This is a standard  result in the war of attrition. 
Equation (16) is also useful in understanding the evolution of the war of attrition from 
the viewpoint of one side.  Consider a group with  9 > . At time  zero there is some 
probability that it's opponent has  9 =  and will concede immediately.  Formally, with  fiV) 
> 0, the left—hand side of (16) is infinite, so the group does not concede. If no one concedes  at 
time zero, both sides know their opponent is not type  . At the "next" instant the 
next—highest  type concedes,  and so on, so as time passes each side learns that its opponent is 
not of cost above a certain level.  When the conditional probability of an opponent's concession 
in the next instant (based on what the group has learned about his highest possible cost) is 
such that (16) just holds, its time to "throw in the towel." 
Given concession  times as a function of  9, the expected date of stabilization  is then the — 17 — 
expected minimum  T. the expectation taken over  F(9).  With n  players the probability that 
a given  9 is the maximum (so that  T(9) is the minimum) is its density  f(O) multiplied by 
the probability that no other  9  is higher, namely  (F(O))°1, multiplied by  n.  With n  2, 
the expected value of  minimum  T, that is, the expected time of  stabilization  TSE, is thus 
TSE  = 
2J  T(x)F(x)f(x)dx. 
9 
As long as all participants  in the process initially believe that someone else has may have a 
higher  9, stabilization does not occur immediately.  The cumulative distribution of 
stabilization times  T  is therefore one minus the probability that every group has a  0  lower 
than the value consistent with stabilization at  T.  With two groups this is 
S(T) = 1  (F(TI))2 
where  9(T)  is defined by  T(O)  T. 
Two observations are useful in helping to explain the key role of heterogeneity. 
Consider first what the model would imply if all groups were identical, that is, if we considered 
a representative agent model. If we interpret  this as there being a single agent, he knows with 
probability one that he will be the stabilizer.  Since  uD  is negative, equation (8) implies that 
expected utility is maximized by choosing  T  equal to zero, that is, by stabilizing 
immediately.  Intuitively, if an individual knows  that he will end up bearing the cost of a 
stabilization, a cost to waiting implies that it is optimal to act immediately. 
Heterogeneity alone is not sufficient, however,  to explain why stabilization is postponed. 
There must also be uncertainty about the cost to waiting of other groups.  If it is known  to ai — 18  — 
that a group has higher costs than anyone else, optimal behavior will imply that this group 
concedes immediately.  Intuitively,  stabilization is postponed because each interest  group 
believes in the possibility that another group will give up first.  As time passes and this 
expectation is not realized, one group finally concedes. 
It is also interesting to compare the sense in which stabilization becomes "inevitable" 
.here to the sense used in Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Drazen and Helpman (1987.1989). In 
those papers a positive deficit (exclusive of debt service) implies that government debt is 
growing  faster than the rate of interest,  so that its present value is not going to zero.  The 
failure of this transversality  condition to hold, and hence the long—run infeasibility of the path, 
is what makes stabilization inevitable.  In our model the war of attrition ends in finite time 
with a stabilization, even if the path of the debt is technically feasible, that is, even if it grows 
less fast than the rate of  interest.  Hence our approach indicates why countries whose policies 
are technically feasible (present discounted value of the debt goes to zero) will eventually 
stabilize if current policies involve welfare loss. ' 
IV. Comparative Statics 
We can now ask how various changes in the parameters or distributions  affect the 
expected time of a stabilization.  Our goal is to see if observable characteristics of economies 
explain why some countries stabilize sooner than others.  We present these results in a number 
of  propositions, and explain each result intuitively.  Proofs are in the appendix. 
PROPOSITION 2:  Higher Distortionarv Taxes or Monetization 
When the utility loss from distortionary taxation is proportional to the level of taxes, financing 
'4Nalebuff  (1982) discusses the war of attrition  with a fixed endpoint. — 19 — 
a greater fraction of the pre—stabilization deficit via distortionary taxation (a higher  -) implies 
an earlier date of stabilization. 
This result may seem initially surprising, for it says that an attempt to control the 
growth of  government indebtedness may actually hasten the date of  stabilization.  A higher  y 
on the one hand implies a greater distortion for a given deficit, inducing players to concede 
earlier.  However, making more of an effort to reduce the deficit implies that government debt 
grows less fast and hence the distortions which induce stabilization also grow less fast.  The 
reason the first effect dominates is that our proportional specification in (5) implies that both 
the gain from being the non—stabilizer  and the loss from no stabilization are proportional to the 
size of the debt, so that a slower growth of the debt does not in itself change their relative 
magnitudes. '5  Higher monetization, for example, has the effect  of raising the cost of living in the 
unstabilized economy relative to the gain from having another group stabilize at each point in 
unLe.  This result is consistent with the idea that is is easier to stabilize hyperinflations than 
irsflations  which are "only" high. 
PROPOSITION  3:  Higher Costs of  Distortions 
An increase in the costs associated with living in an unstabilized economy, for an unchanged 
distribution of  9, will move the expected date of a stabilization forward. 
lsWhen the utility loss from distortionary  taxation rises more than proportionally with the 
level of taxes (as in footnote 10). the effect  of slower growth of the deficit may dominate.  It 
can be shown  (details are available) that low  0  groups  will concede later, so that if it happens 
that both groups have low  0, increased  y will mean a later date of stabilization. — 20 — 
Countries with institutions that lessen the utility loss from distortionary financing of 
government expenditures (such as indexation) will, other things equal, be expected to postpone 
stabilization longer.  The caveat here is that increased indexation may induce greater 
monetization or higher prices  for a given level of  monetization.  This appears relevant for the 
Israeli case. 
If  the utility loss is an increasing (perhaps convex) function of inflation, a sharp 
acceleration of inflation will lead to a stabilization.  This would explain the timing of the 
French and German stabilizations. 
PROPOSITION 4:  Lower  Political Cohesion 
If a = 1/2  stabilization  occurs  immediately;  the larger  is  a  above  1/2, the later is the 
expected date of stabilization. 
The difference in the shares of the burden of stabilization, a, could be interpreted  as 
representing the degree of  political cohesion in the society.  Countries with a  close to  1/2  can 
be characterized as having high political cohesion in that the burden of  stabilization  is shared 
relatively equally, while those where the burden is very unequal, so that a is close to one, are 
more polarized or less cohesive.  When the relative burden of a stabilization  is very unequally 
distributed,  the gain to waiting in the hope that one's opponent will concede is larger.  Hence 
each group holds out longer. 
This intuitive result suggests a relationship between certain measures of political 
stability and macroeconomic outcomes.  Roubini and Sachs (l989a,b)  argue that governments 
composed of large, short—lived,  and uncohesive coalitions are associated with large budget 
deficits.  They construct an index of political cohesion  and stability in the government and —21 — 
show a strong correlation between that index and budget deficits after  1973 in several industrial 
countries.  One explanation of this finding consistent with our model  concerns reaching 
decisions within the coalition.  Large coalitions of politically diverse parties find it particularly 
hard to reach agreement on how allocate tax increases or expenditure cuts among the 
constituencies represented by coalition partners.  In the absence of  such agreement, deficits 
grow. 
It should be emphasized, however, that empirical correlations between political and 
economic instability do not establish causation in one direction.  Though we emphasize a causal 
link from political to economic instability,  there may of course be causal kinks in the opposite 
direction.  26 
Greater dispersion in the distribution of income or resources can affect the timing of 
stabilization  if a group's cost  9  is a function of its income.  Since delayed stabilization requires 
relative cost be unknown to other groups, this means that relative positions in the income 
distribution must be unknown.  We find such an assumption somewhat problematic.  An 
increase in income inequality may itself make relative positions apparent,  leading to an 
immediate stabilization. 
if one is willing to accept uncertainty  about relative income, naive intution suggests 
that a mean—preserving  spread in the distribution of  income will lead to an ea:..er date of 
stabilization, since it means some group will have  a higher cost and thus conceá earlier.  Such 
reasoning is incomplete, for it ignores the change in behavior (that is, in the func. n 1(0)) 
induced by the change in the distribution of costs.  The fatter upper tail for costs, means that 
each group perceives a higher likelihood that its opponents' costs have increased.  his 
'6For a recent insightful study of economic determinants  of political instability,  See Londegran 
and Poole (1989). — 22 — 
perception wou.ld lead it to hold out longer.  When will this latter effect dominate, so that a 
greater dispersion in income could lead to later expected stabilization? 
PROPOSITION  5:  Income Dispersion and Longer Delays in Stabilizing 
If the utility loss due to distortionary taxes is a decreasing, convex function of income, and 
income is unobservable, a mean—preserving  spread in the distribution of income  G(y) that 
keeps the expected minimum of the  y's  constant implies  a later expected date of stabilization. 
Note that if  9' (y) < 0, it is the "poor" who stabilize, since the "rich" suffer from the 
distortions arising from budget deficits less and thus can hold out longer.  The crucial 
assumption of uncertainty  about income is perhaps more reasonable under the second 
interpretation  of costs in section II, namely as resources  that must be devoted to the political 
process to avoid bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of stabilization.  y  would  then 
be resources available forpolitical purposes.  With uncertainty both about the relative political 
skills of groups and about what fraction of their resources they are willing  to devote to the 
political struggle, assuming uncertainty  about relative "income" seems more defensible. 
An empirical finding consistent with Proposition 5 is presented by Berg and Sachs 
(1988), who find a strong empirical relation between the degree of income  inequality and the 
frequency of debt rescheduling.  Countries with a more unequal income  distribution  have 
experienced more difficulties in servicing their external debt.  Although this evidence is not 
directly related to the timing of stabilization policies, it is consistent with the idea that 
countries with more income inequality  will, at a given level of debt, find it more difficult to 
adopt policies  necessary to insure  solvency and service  the debt. — 23 — 
IV. Extensions - 
We have  presented  a model  showing  how  delayed  stabilization can  be explained in a 
model of rational heterogeneous agents.  In contrast, the same model with a rational 
representative individual would yield immediate stabilization.  Since we summarized many of 
the results in the introductory  section, we c9nclude first by discussing some generalizations and 
second by touching on some issues which the model did not address but which are important in 
explaining stabilization. 
First, we used the example of tax increases made necessary by budget deficits inducing a 
war of attrition because it is particularly  relevant for hyperinflations.  Our argument is far 
more general.  Any policy  change with strong distributional consequences can give rise to a war 
of attrition. 
Second, for simplicity we considered a case where there was no change in external 
circumstances following the original shock.  More generally, once a war of attrition has been 
going on, a change  in the environment (including aid or intervention from abroad) may lead to 
a change in agents' behavior and rapid concession  by one side.  Even (or especially) when this 
change is forseen,  the war of attrition is crucial in the delay of stabilization until the external 
change. 
A third generalization is a more precise formalization of the political process leading to 
stabilization.  In particular, this would  lead to a more satisfactory characterization of the 
political costs involved in sheltering oneself from bearing the burden of stabilization.  As in the 
model above, such costs may increase with the size of the outstanding  debt: as the difference 
between payoffs  to winners and losers rise, as a result of the growing level of the debt, each side 
should be willing  to expend more time and resources in activities such as lobbying to induces its 
rivals to concede.  Since different groups differ in their political influence or access to resources, —24— 
such direct political costs will be central to the timing of  concession.  We did not model this 
formally, since the simplicity of our model depended on costs being simply proportional to 
current taxes, an assumption which appears difficult to justify for political costs.  Nonetheless 
we think political costs are no less important than costs of distortions in the war of attrition. 
A political model also suggests alternative  interpretations of  some of  our results.  For 
example, in Proposition 3, the effect of a shift in  U could be interpreted  as follows.  Countries 
with political institutions  which make it relatively more difficult for opposing groups to "veto" 
stabilization  programs not ot their liking will stabilize sooner. 
Finally, let us note some issues we did not discuss.  First, delays in successful 
stabilization are related to the issue of failed stabilization and hence to what determines the 
probability of success.  Sargent (1982,1984) identified "credibility" as a crucial ingredient of 
success, where a "credible" stabilization  is program is one in which a "strong" policymaker is 
firmly committed to the plan and is not likely to give in to pressure to abandon fiscal 
responsibility and revert to inflationary  finance.  If the public is uncertain about the degree of 
commitment of the policymaker to fiscal responsibility, success  is seen to be less likely.17 
Dornbusch (1988) criticizes this notion of credibility because of a lack of predictive power, 
arguing that successful and unsuccessful programs often appear quite similar ex ante.  As 
examples, be refers to Poincare's successful 1926 stabilization in comparison with his 
unsuccessful 1924 attempt, and to the several unsuccessful attempts in Germany prior to the 
November 1923 program. 
In our model  Sargent's notion of credibility plays no role.  Instead our model suggests 
that stabilizations need  not be associated either with a sharp change in external circomstances. 
'TBackus  and Driffill  (1985), Barro (1986), and Tabellini 
(1988? study dynamic games in which 
the public is uncertain about whether a policymaker is "strong' or "weak". — 25 — 
nor with the program being implemented looking sharply different than what had previously 
been proposed.  A program which was unsuccessful at one point in time may later be successful 
(thus "credible" in Sargent's words) simply due to the passage of time.  In the war of attrition, 
passage of time and the accumulation of costs leads one group to give in and make a previously 
rejected program economically and politically feasible. 
Second,  in reality successful stabilizations are not one—shot affairs.  One component of 
success is designing  how the adjustment  process should be spread out over time.  Our notion of 
timing was in the timing of the beginning of a successful  program, not of the timing of its 
stages once it has begun.  On a basic level, these could be separated, with this paper addressing 
the question of why significant policy changes, multistage or otherwise, are delayed.  In fact, 
since stabilization takes time, programs often appear successful for a period of time, only to 
subsequently fail.  Hence, the issue of delayed stabilization should ideally be considered 
simultaneously with issues of both partial and multistage stabilizations. 
Finally, we have not explicitly considered important  political events such as elections. 
The timing of elections may be related to the timing of  stabilizations.  An electoral result 
favorable to one side may make it far more difficult for their opponents to block their programs 
and shelter themselves from the costs of stabilization.  Thus, one might expect successful 
stabilizations following  elections with a clear winner.  In the terminology of our model, a clear 
electoral result may be an important signal of the distribution of the relative strength of 
different groups.  Future research should model  this relationship more explicitly A—i 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma  1 
Differentiating (8) with respect to  T1  one obtains 
(Al)  = eTi 
[h(TxvN(Ti) 
— vS(Ti)) + 
s  dVS(T.) 
(1 
— 
H(T1))(u(T1) 
— rV  (Ti) +  dT  )] 
Using the definitions of vN(T), vS(T), and u(t) (Al) becomes 
(A2)  =eTi  {h(T1)(2a_i)e(_'rTi 
+ 
(1 
— 
H(T)) [yr( 
—  — 
O&e(1_7)1Ti]] 
Differentiating with respect to  8  we obtain 
(A3) 
— (1 — H(T1))e(_7)tTi < 
Equation (A3) means  that when others are acting optimally, dEtJ/dT  is decreasing in  O. 
Optimal concession time  T is therefore  monotonically  decreasing in  8. 
Proof of Proposition  1  (This proof closely follows Bliss and Nalebuff  [1984]) 
Suppose the other interest group  is acting according to  T(8), the optimal concession 
time for a group with utility cost  8.  Choosing a time  T  as above would be equivalent  to 
choosing a value  and conceding at time T = T(  9k).  Equation (8) becomes,  after the 
change in variables 
(A4)  EU(O,8) = F(Oi))  uD(x)e_rT(x)T(x)dx + e_rT(Oi)VS(T())] 
+  [JuD(z)e_rTT(z)dz + e_rT(VN(T(x))]f(x)dx.  x=O.  x A—2 
Differentiating with respect to  9  and setting the resulting expression equal to zero we obtain 
(where we drop the  i  subscript) 
(A5); 
dEU = 
f(O)[(/S(T(9)) 
— 
vN(Tj))] + 
F(9)(u  (0,9) 
— ryS + .T_)T'(G) = 0. 
winch becomes after substitutions 
(A6)  ii1  = — f(9)(2a —1)— F(0h'r(9 +  — a)T'(O) = 0. 
ao 
Now by the definition of  T(0) as the optimal time of concession for a group with cost  9,  9 = 0 
when  9  is chosen optimally.  The first—order condition (A6) evaluated at  0 = 9  implies (14). 
(Substituting  T'(0) evaluated at  0  from (14) into (A6) one sees that the second order 
condition is satisfied, since (A6) then implies  that sign dEU/d9 = sign (9— 9).)  To derive the 
initial  boundary condition note first that for any value of  0  ,  the gain to having the 
opponent concede is positive.  Therefore as long  as  f() is nonzero, groups with  9 <  will not 
concede immediately.  This in turn implies  that a group with  0 =  (that is, that knows  it has 
the highest possible cost of waiting) will find it optimal to concede immediately.  Thus  T() = 
Proof  of Proposition 2 
A higher fraction of pre—stabilization  deficits financed by taxation corresponds to a higher 
value of  y.  Comparing the optimal time of  concession  as a function of  0  for y> y, we have 
T'(0)=_.43 
(2a 
— l)/r 
(0 +  - 
(A7) 
T'(9) =  (2cr  —1)/r 
y(9+-a) 
Since  —  is the same in both cases, the initial  boundary condition is the same for  and A—3 
-y, that is,  T(V) = T() = 0.  Inspection of (A7) indicates that  T'(8) > T'(8)  for all values of 
8.  Combining these two results, we have that  T(O)  > T(8)  for  U < .  Equation (17) then 
implies that  TSE > j.SE 
Proof  of Proposition 3 
A multiplicative shift in  8  has an identical effect to an increase in  'y  in Proposition 2.  By an 
argument analogous to the one used in that proof,  T(O)  will shift down and hence TSE will 
fall. 
Proof  of Proposition 4 
When  a = 1/2, vS = vN.  Since there are costs to not conceding, it is optimal to 
concede immediately.  To prove the second part of the proposition, the same argument as in 
Proposition 2 shows that T() = T() = 0  for  a> a.  Since the right—hand side of  (14) 
increases with an increase in  a,  T'(8) > T'(O)  for all values  of  0.  Using the same reasoning 
as in Proposition 2, we have that  T(O) > T(O)  for  8 < . Equation  (17) then  implies that 
TSE > jSE 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Suppose 8 =  with 8' <  0, where a group's income y  is unobservable.  Let  G(y,o)  be 
the distribution of income with bounds  and ,  where increases in  correspond to a more 
disperse income distribution.  Increasing  o'  corresponds  to a mean—preserving  spread of income 
if for some y 
G(y,) ￿  0  for y ￿  y 
G(y,o)￿0  fory>y 
The  expected  minimum value of y can  be  written as 
(A8)  E(ymin) = 2JY(l 
— G(x,))g(x,u)xdx. A—4 
which by integration by parts equals  I  (1 
— G(x,o))2dx. Constant expected y  implies 
(A9)  j  (1 
— G(x,o))G  (x,o)dx = 0.  a 
(A9) and (17) in the text imply 
SE  ry 
(AlO)  T  (a)  = 
2j  T(x,a)(1 — G(x,a))g(x,a)dx. 
Repeated integration by parts implies that (AlO) can be written as 
TSE  2c_11)'  1  dx  (a) = 
j  (1 
— G(x,a))g(x,a) 
2a— ir  —  1/2 
+JRl—G( 
2  1 
x,a))  = 
r7  LO(  +  —  a  0(x)  +  —  a'  0'(x)dx]. 
If the change in  a  does not affect the lower bound  and if  ￿  0, we have 
dTSE(a) —  — 2a —  1 
J(i 
— G(x,a))G  (x,a  _____  ____  1 
1  )2 0'(x)dx]  da 
—  r  a  0(x)  +  —  a 
2a—  1  0'(y) 
2J(l_G(x,a))Ga(x,a)  =0.  -  T7  a) REFERENCES 
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